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DISABLED AUTONOMY
KATHERINE L. MOORE, J.D.
Disability law is still undertheorized.1 In 2007, Ruth Colker wrote that
disability law was undertheorized because it conflated “separate” with
“unequal,” and because disability was largely ignored or poorly understood
within theories of justice.2 The solution for Colker was to attach the antisubordination perspective, which was developed to apply to race and sex, directly
to disability.3 This Article argues that this transportation from the race and sex
contexts was a partial solution, but is not sufficient to give full substance to
disability law theory.
Concepts from critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence have long
been simply transported into the disability context, acting as an imperfect
facsimile. The primary purpose of those concepts was to describe, analyze, and
remedy problems primarily related to race and gender, not disability. While
disability law has benefitted to some extent from inclusion in these legal theories,
many of the unique features and complexities of disability law have been left on
the table. This Article explores those complexities. Autonomy, usually thought
of as an uncomplicated social good for other groups, is challenged in disability
theory by two competing values. The value of anti-subordination is critical
because it seeks to address, and redress, discrimination, sigma, and stereotyping.
An anti-subordination perspective gives a voice and supplies resources to people
with disabilities, and will counsel against choices that support stigma and
stereotyping. An anti-subordination perspective might seek to limit a right to
physician-assisted suicide, for example, because of concerns about exploitation
and the messaging that disabled lives are not worth living. This runs counter to
an autonomy-focused perspective, which would support the choice to end one’s
life in the end stages of a terminal disease.
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An anti-eliminationism perspective advocates for the preservation of, and
resources for, disabled lives. This comes to mean that not only are people with
disabilities valued, but their disability is valued too. Instead of seeking to end
Autism, for example, an anti-elimination perspective seeks to support Autistics.
However, an anti-eliminationism perspective might also support the restriction
of choice, and therefore come into conflict with autonomy, where there is a
choice that results in the end of a disability. An anti-elimination perspective
could seek to restrict the ability to selectively terminate pregnancies when a
disability is found, for example. Anti-eliminationism inherently challenges the
notion that getting rid of disability is a good thing.
Parts I, II, and III of this Article describe the values of autonomy, antisubordination, and anti-eliminationism in the disability context, and argue that
these values are each critical components of disability law and theory. Part IV of
this article provides an overview of some real-world examples where these
values come into immediate conflict.
A NOTE ON LANGUAGE
The term ‘disability’ itself exemplifies some of the tensions described in
this piece. It is both a big-tent platform and a narrow descriptor. In this article,
the term ‘disability’ is used fluidly. The legal definition under the Americans
with Disabilities Act4 is different from that used by the Social Security
Administration,5 and from the United Nations6 definition; there are assuredly
more, including those that provide more precision and description.7
4. “A person who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, a person who has a history or record of such an impairment, or a person who is perceived
by others as having such an impairment.” Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)
(1990).
5. SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
DISABILITY
EVALUATION
UNDER
SO.
SEC.,
https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/general-info.htm. A person who is “not able to
engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) because of a medically-determinable physical or mental
impairment(s): That is expected to result in death, or that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous
period of at least 12 months.” Id.
6. “Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or
sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others.” UNITED NATIONS, The UN Convention on Rights
of
Persons
with
Disabilities,
Article
1
Purpose
(2012),
https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-withdisabilities/article-1-purpose.html.
7. The CDC identifies disabilities that affect a person’s “Vision, Movement, Thinking,
Remembering, Learning, Communicating, Hearing, Mental Health, and Social Relationships,” CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Disability and Healthy Overview (last visited Aug. 1 2017)
www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/disability.html; See also The World Health Organization
identifies three dimensions to disability: “1. Impairment in a person’s body structure or function, or mental
functioning; examples of impairments include loss of a limb, loss of vision or memory loss. 2. Activity
limitation, such as difficulty seeing, hearing, walking, or problem solving. 3. Participation restrictions in
normal daily activities, such as working, engaging in social and recreational activities, and obtaining
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Furthermore, there are language-reclaiming movements within the
disability community similar to in other social justice movements. For example,
the use of the word ‘crip’ is similar to that of ‘queer’ in terms of self-definitional
linguistics.8 The term ‘crip,’ as used by some, is intentionally an inclusive term,
“representing all disabilities: people with vastly divergent physical and
psychological differences.”9 On the other hand, ‘people-first’ language (‘person
with a disability’) is frequently favored,10 while others argue that it unnecessarily
“separates disability from the person”11 (who therefore advocate the term
‘disabled person’). Many Autistics state that they prefer to be called Autistic
rather than ‘person with Autism’.12 Furthermore, some people who are
categorized as disabled by society and the law do not self-identify as such: many
Deaf people advance the notion that they are not disabled, but merely possess a
trait in common with each other.13
Throughout, this piece attempts to utilize non-ableist language. Any
missteps are the author’s own.
I. THE VALUE OF AUTONOMY
Autonomy, independence, and freedom of mind and body are centrally
important to people with disabilities. The traditional philosophical concept of
autonomy is that it can be framed as ‘self-ownership’. If you ‘own’ your life, the
choices you make might be tied intimately to your sense of self.
People with disabilities may experience autonomy and choice – and
therefore their sense of self – differently than non-disabled people. It is of unique
concern to people whose autonomy is often taken away. Furthermore, the
Kantian emphasis on rationality can also be used a weapon to strip certain
individuals of their own autonomy.

health care and preventive services.” WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Classification of Functioning,
Disability and Health (ICF) (2001), www.who.int/classifications/icf/en.
8. See, e.g., ROBERT MCGRUER, CRIP THEORY: CULTURAL SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND DISABILITY
(2006).
9. JULIE WILLIAMS, WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY, Crip Theory, www.wright.edu/event/sexdisability-conference/crip-theory.
10. See
Kathie
Snow,
Examples
of
People
First
Language,
https://1.cdn.edl.io/AUiNZe8nGx3v99lSy0wI09mCC6OQDKyj0TUusR3qiD4TJD7n.pdf
(giving
examples of how to use people-first language and phrases instead of disability-first language).
11. JULIE WILLIAMS, supra note 9.
12. See for example: “I would appreciate it, if I end up in your article, if you describe me as ‘an
autistic’ or ‘an autistic person,’ versus the ‘person with,”‘ Ms. Dawson wrote in an e-mail message. ‘Just
like you would feel odd if people said you were a ‘person with femaleness.’” Amy Harmon, How About
Not ‘Curing’ Us, Some Autistics Are Pleading, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2004).
13. See Megan A. Jones, Deafness as Culture: A Psychosocial Perspective, 22(2) DISABILITY
STUDIES QUARTERLY 51, 51 (2002) (describing the view among “proponents of deafness as a culture”
who have “asserted that deafness is not a pathology and therefore does not need to be ‘fixed.’”)
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A. Autonomy as Self-Ownership
Autonomy is generally seen as a social good, when it doesn’t infringe on
others.14 Moreover, it is frequently cited as an American value,15 described as a
“central value underlying the First Amendment’s commitment to free
expression.”16 Gerald Dworkin for example defines autonomy as “the capacity
to accept or attempt to change [preferences, desires and wishes] in light of
higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons
define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take
responsibility for the kind of person they are.”17 So when people exercise
autonomy, they don’t merely break free of restraint or control; they take
ownership of their choices and their lives.18 Setting the stage for any discussion
of the deeper nuances of the human drive for autonomy is not a simple
proposition. The desire to hold ownership over one’s own life is for some people
rooted in religion, while perhaps simultaneously constrained by it;19 for some
natural law dictates such20; and for others, freedom and autonomy must go hand
in hand.21 Kant writes of the rational will as an autonomous expression of our
humanity, for when we make moral choices by exercising our autonomy, we
express our will, and thus we are human.22

14. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY (1989)
(discussing the origin of the “modern self”); Robert A. Burt, Self-Determination and the Wrongfulness of
Death, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 177 (1999).
15. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994).
16. Id. at 875.
17. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988).
18. Id.
19. See Kathleen M. Boozang, An Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and Religion in
Dying, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 549 (1997) (arguing for a legal scheme that would respect a family’s religious
beliefs when making treatment decisions for incapacitated patients).
20. Taylor charts this development in Sources of the Self (note 14 supra); John Locke’s labor theory
of property posits that “every man has a Property in his own Person” and therefore their labor. JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE, § 27, 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690). Notable critics of this conception include Oscar Wilde, who noted
that it “harmed individualism, and obscured it, by confusing a man with what he possesses.” OSCAR
WILDE, THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALISM 13 (The Floating Press 2009) (1891). The question of how
and where to draw the property lines when discussing the ownership of oneself and one’s life do have
bearing on disability law, including some of the areas discussed herein. For example, the right to commit
suicide is discussed infra, with a distinction drawn between when society chooses to focus on suicide
prevention and when the choice to die is instead accepted or even promoted. Outside the scope of this
Article, but relevant to the discussion, are the right to hand over decision-making power regarding one’s
health choices, the extent to which the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) affects
property rights to genetic testing results, and the use of genetic testing information in disability insurance.
See Brandon Keim, Genetic Protections Skimp on Privacy, Says Gene Tester, WIRED, May 23, 2008,
https://www.wired.com/2008/05/genetic-protect/.
21. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762).
22. Immanuel Kant, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1781) (writing on freedom as selfdetermination and arguiung that individual freedom is achieved through participation in the political
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A main concern then emerges is the following: what meaning does one’s
life have, if internal decision-making is co-opted in some way? When choices
are removed and when options are limited, our life’s meaning and purpose may
be stunted. Autonomy as a life-affirming value, in that it promotes the individual
self-determination and expression of will that defines our humanity in some
ways. Simultaneously, limiting the autonomy of another individual diminishes
that person’s humanity by disallowing their free expression of will.
The limits on individual autonomy traditionally arose from social,
community, and religious pressures in order to avoid taking action.23 This is
because of the perceived potential harm it may cause to oneself or others.24 There
may be areas where we may “do just as we please”, there are areas where perhaps
we “ought” to do something, and there are some areas where we may not do
anything at all.25 Beyond personal preference, we are limited in what we can do
and what choices we make.26
But there are other potential limits on autonomy, and this Article will
investigate whether the values discussed below of anti-subordination and antieliminationism will rise to a level that justifies that limitation. Going forward,
this Article will refer to autonomy primarily in the ‘ownership of one’s life’
sense, which has implications for one’s life choices,27 and, additionally, by
extension the idea of ‘ownership’ over one’s choices in reproduction and as to
one’s children.28 Autonomy’s cousin, self-reliance, will also be discussed as it
relates to self-definition and disability.
B. Autonomy as a Central Concern of Disability
Autonomy is of particular concern to people with disabilities.29 Facing a
society that limits the ability to participate in employment, activities, social and
civic life, the “major life activities” referenced by the Americans with
Disabilities Act30 as well as the minor life activities of everyday living, people
with disabilities are perhaps uniquely positioned to articulate the human drive
process); See also Paul Guyer, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW AND HAPPINESS 13 (Brown University Press
2000) (arguing for the intrinsic value of freedom of choice).
23. See Lawrence C. Becker, Crimes Against Autonomy: Gerald Dworkin On The Enforcement of
Morality, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV 959 (discussing criminal sanctions designed to limit autonomy).
24. See id.
25. Id. at 960.
26. Id.
27. See discussion of Sexual Consent and Physician Assisted Suicide, infra Section IV. C.
28. See discussion of Prenatal Testing and Anti-Autism rhetoric, infra Section IV. E.
29. See
DISABILITY
RIGHTS
CALIFORNIA,
PRINCIPLES:
PERSONAL
AUTONOMY,
http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/legislature/Principles/102401.htm (last updated Sept. 16, 2017) (stating
that “[a]ll people, including children, have the right to maintain personhood, bodily integrity, and personal
autonomy. They also have the right to the services and supports they need to grow, develop naturally, and
to live fully-integrated lives of quality in their own homes and communities.”).
30. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (hereinafter ADA).
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towards autonomy and away from restraint. This is especially relevant in cases
where an individual is beholden to someone else’s decision-making about their
own life.
The struggle for autonomy for people with disabilities has been a hardfought road. It encompasses a history laden with the abuse of vulnerable
populations in profound ways.31 Accessibility and inclusion within society have
been historically unavailable to people with disabilities, and abuse, neglect, and
segregation from mainstream society32 have been commonplace.
Autonomy over decision-making and a sense of self-ownership are key to
ensuring that people with disabilities remain present, integrated, and seen in the
public sphere. People with disabilities must be recognized as valuable to society,
both as Kantian “ends in themselves”33 and as distinct contributors to diversity
of thought and experience.34 Autonomy is integral to this conception. As
described supra, autonomy is an expression of intrinsic humanity.35 This
manifestation of choice and will is what makes us human.
Moreover, the history of autonomous self-determination for vulnerable
groups is a history of oppression.36 Robert Burt traced this history when he wrote
that, in American history:
[E]ach act of liberation carried out in the name of the selfdetermination ideal - was accompanied by a powerful reaction, a
powerful oppression directed against some other, more socially
vulnerable group. This attack was, moreover, specifically directed
against the imagined capacity, the right, of the members of this group
to see themselves and be seen as “self- determining selves.” At the
very moment, that is, that this capacity, this right, was awarded to
some people, it was withheld from - and even diminished from its
previous, though tentative, recognition in - other people.37
Burt argues that the social liberations of one group have been followed by
increased oppressions against other groups, which falls at the feet of self-

31. See Colker, supra note 1.
32. See DISABILITY RIGHTS CALIFORNIA, WHAT WE DO, https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/whatwe-do/strategic-plan (exemplifying organizational goals, initiative, and objectives of Disability Rights
California to remediate past accessibility and inclusion issues).
33. See Immanuel Kant, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (Cambridge U. Press
2012) (1785) (“So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, but
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”). Id.
34. See David Bernstein, Some Disabilities Are Actually Quite Good For Society, GOOD April 27,
2013; See also Elizabeth Barnes, Valuing Disability, Causing Disability 125 ETHICS 88 (2014) (proposing
the “mere difference” view of disability, arguing against value judgements related to disability as
contrasted with non-disability, and that people with disabilities would be just as well off as the nondisabled in a just society).
35. Supra notes 20—23 and accompanying text.
36. See Burt, supra note 14.
37. Id. at 197.

2019]

DISABLED AUTONOMY

251

determination.38 Burt writes that the self-determination ideal’s dark side is an
“inherent inclination of this ideal toward harmful inflictions on socially
vulnerable people, that is, a ‘slippery slope’ toward injustice and
oppression.”39This ‘dark side’ of autonomy is of concern to people with
disabilities because it reveals the conflict that occurs when autonomy clashes
with other values and principles, specifically those values that promote the
protection or empowerment of vulnerable groups. Finally, as Carlos Ball argues,
the value of autonomy places a particular responsibility on society to help people
with disabilities exercise that autonomy.40 “The emphasis that the disability
rights movement places on deinstitutionalization and independent living shows
the crucial role that notions of autonomy play in allowing the disabled to lead
good and fulfilling lives.”41 Therefore, Ball argues, justice demands “a
requirement that needs be met in a way that provides the individual with as much
personal autonomy as is possible under the circumstances.”42 Autonomy must
essentially be maximized.43
C. The ‘Rational Mind’ as a Tool to Remove Autonomy
The final piece of the autonomy puzzle is the use of the ‘rational mind’ as
a tool, or weapon, to remove autonomy from people with disabilities. Here, there
are two concerns. First, people with certain mental illnesses, Intellectual
Disability, developmental disabilities, or cognitive functioning limitations may
not actually be able to make rational decisions under certain criteria, either
during particular times or throughout their lives. But second, there is a long
history of discrimination and abuse that has been justified by the assumption that
people with these disabilities are fundamentally incapable of rational thought, an
assumption that is based on stigma, fear, and ignorance. If autonomy is centered
on rationality, people with disabilities will struggle to hold on to their own power
of choice.
As discussed supra, Kant writes of the rational will as an autonomous
expression of our humanity; when we make moral choices by exercising our
autonomy, we express our will, and thus we are human.44 What, then, when we
cannot express a rational will? The ability to express rational will can be inhibited
38. Id. at 201.
39. Id. at 201.
40. Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, And Disability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 599, 633 (2000).
41. Id.
42. Id. . Ball writes generally that “[t]he concept of autonomy places on society a moral obligation
to assist individuals with disabilities when their basic human functional capabilities are impaired.” Id. at
599.
43. See id.
44. Immanuel Kant, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1781); See also Paul Guyer, KANT ON
FREEDOM, LAW AND HAPPINESS (Brown University Press 2000) (arguing for the intrinsic value of
freedom of choice).
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by mental illness.45 The ability to communicate rational will might be limited by
constraints on the ability to communicate.46 Intellectual Disability, a
developmental disability, or cognitive functioning limitation might also interfere
here, and in particular might interfere with communication of that will.47 In this
case, the law provides a remedy of sorts in guardianship: the provision of “a legal
process consisting of a court-appointed relationship between a competent adult
and a person over the age of eighteen whose dis-ability renders him/her unable
to make an informed decision or at risk of doing harm to self or others due to an
inability to manage his/her own affairs.”48 The relationship created by
guardianship might be troubled or even abusive.49
Next, the mere assumption that people with certain disabilities cannot make
rational choices is frequently enough to limit their autonomy. Historically, a
diagnosis of Intellectual Disability was considered an insurmountable barrier to
achieving independence and self-sufficiency. As a result, persons with
45. Take for example psychosis, which “is defined as the experience of loss of contact with reality,
and is not part of the person’s cultural group belief system or experience.” A person experiencing
psychosis have delusions or “fixed false beliefs” which “beliefs do not change or modify when the person
is presented with new ideas or facts. Types of Mental Illness, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
www.namica.org/resources/mental-illness/types-mental-illness.
46. Id. (noting that when an individual experiences hallucinations, it can be very confusing to
surrounding family, friends, and caretakers).
47. Approximately 1.2 million adults have Intellectual Disability or a developmental disability, or a
condition that limits cognitive functioning. Matthew W. Brault, U.S. Census Bureau, Americans with
Disabilities:
2010
Household
Economic
Studies,
1,
9
(2012),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2012/demo/p70-131.pdf. Developmental disability is an
umbrella term that includes Intellectual Disability, which is characterized by significant limitations in both
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical skills.
ROBERT L. SCHALOCK ET AL., AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 1 (11th ed. 2010)
(hereinafter “AAIDD”). The cognitive aspect of Intellectual Disability refers to reasoning, planning,
solving problems, thinking abstractly, comprehending complex ideas, and learning. Adaptive functioning
refers to a collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that are learned and performed by people
in their everyday lives. Id.
Persons with Intellectual Disability have limitations in certain adaptive behaviors that impact conceptual,
social, or practical functioning. See AAIDD; See also Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders
Intellectual
Disability
Fact
Sheet,
AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N,
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-IntellectualDisability.pdf (hereinafter “DSM-5 Fact Sheet”). Conceptual functioning relates to the ability to
communicate orally, read, write, reason, learn and retain knowledge and information. Id. Social
functioning encompasses the ability to have empathy, make social judgments, socialize, interact with
others and make and retain friendships. Id. Practical functioning may involve the ability to engage in
personal care, manage money, use transportation, conduct housekeeping activities, maintain a safe
environment, use the phone and perform other activities of daily living. See e.g. Introduction to
Intellectual
Disability,
THE
ARC,
https://thearc.org/wpcontent/uploads/forchapters/Introduction%20to%20ID.pdf.
48. Future Care Planning, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, www.naminys.org/mental-healthsupport/navigating-details/future-care-planning.
49. Though outside the scope of this Article, the relationship between a person with a disability and
a ‘guardian’ raises substantial issues of autonomy and self-direction.
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intellectual disability faced involuntary institutionalization, forced sterilization
and segregation from the community. In the landmark decision Olmstead v. L.C.
ex rel. Zimring, the United States Supreme Court determined that unjustified
institutional segregation of individuals with intellectual disability constituted
discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).50
Following Olmstead, States were no longer allowed to put individuals with
disabilities in state- run institutions if they were capable of – and consented to –
being integrated into the community.51 For an example of how decision-making
and choice have historically been forcibly removed from people with disabilities,
women with Intellectual Disability were targeted as early subjects of what would
become a sweeping global eugenics movement that spanned from 1890 to the
early 1940s, and decades longer in some marginalized communities.52
The purported goal of the eugenics movement was to create a “superior
human stock” by eradicating the reproduction of those deemed “unfit.”53
Eugenicists believed that social problems, such as so-called feeble-mindedness,
poverty, and unwanted children could be alleviated by controlling social
breeding.54 Approximately 70,000 women and men were involuntarily sterilized
in the United States during the eugenics movement.55
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell sanctioned the
eugenics movement by upholding a Virginia law that permitted involuntary
sterilization of people with disabilities when a state institution deemed it in the
best interest of the resident and society.56 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a
fervent supporter of eugenics, wrote the opinion for the Court.57 In a decisive
two-page decision, he determined it was the duty of society to “prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind,” and ended the opinion with
his now infamous words: “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”58 By

50. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (effective July 26, 1990); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597
(1999).
51. Olmstead 527 U.S. at 597.
52. See, e.g., JAMES W. TRENT JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL
RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 193-194 (1994) (detailing the history of forced sterilization in the
United States); Lutz Kaelber, Eugenics/Sexual Sterilizations in North Carolina, Eugenics: Compulsory
Sterilization in 50 American States, https://www.uvm.edu/~lkaelber/eugenics/NC/NC.html (providing
data on steralizations in North Carolina from 1924 to 1973) (last updated Oct. 30, 2014).
53. TRENT, supra note 52, at 136.
54. Id.
55. Adam Cohen, Fresh Air: The Supreme Court Ruling that led to 70,000 Forced Sterilizations,
NATIONAL
PUBLIC
RADIO
(March
7,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2016/03/07/469478098/the- supreme-court-ruling-that-led-to-70-000-forced-sterilizations.
56. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206 (1927).
57. Id. at 205.
58. Id. at 207.
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1930, more than 30 states had passed involuntary sterilization statutes.59
Although no longer regarded as defensible law, the United States Supreme Court
has not yet explicitly overruled Buck v. Bell.60
Although Buck v. Bell was decided nearly 90 years ago, the biases and
stereotypes that drove the eugenics movement continue to harm parents with
Intellectual Disability today.61 As recently as 1994, child welfare agency workers
told a parent with Intellectual Disability that if she consented to sterilization she
would get her children back.62 The mother underwent a tubal ligation.63 The child
welfare agency nonetheless moved forward to recommend the termination of the
mother’s parental rights.64Furthermore, stigma and discrimination are an fact of
life for many people with mental disabilities.65 People with mental illness
frequently face “poverty, homelessness and unemployment due to discrimination
in the workplace and the benefits system.”66 Stigma and negative attitudes are so
significant that they prevent people with mental illness from seeking medical
treatment.67 This is due to both the e prejudice and discrimination.68
Common misconceptions about mental illness yield three primary models
of discrimination: “fear and exclusion: persons with severe mental illness should
be feared and, therefore, be kept out of most communities;” “authoritarianism:
persons with severe mental illness are irresponsible, so life decisions should be
made by others;” and “benevolence: persons with severe mental illness are
childlike and need to be cared for.”69 These misconceptions persist because
prejudice is “(1) largely invisible, (2) largely socially acceptable, and (3)
frequently practiced (consciously and unconsciously). “70

59. Philip R. Reilly, Involuntary Sterilization in the United States: A Surgical Solution, 62 THE Q.
REV. OF BIOLOGY 153 (1987).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (8th Cir. 2001).
63. Id. at 1128.
64. Id.
65. David Batty, People with Mental Illness Face Widespread Discrimination, THE GUARDIAN,
(April 28, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2004/apr/28/equality.mentalhealth.
66. Id.
67. Claire Henderson et al., Mental Illness Stigma, Help Seeking, and Public Health Programs, 103
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 777 (2013).
68. See id.; see also Sara Heath, Understanding Stigma as a Mental Health Access Barrier, PATIENT
ENGAGEMENT
HIT:
PATIENT
CARE
ACCESS
NEWS
(June
8,
2017),
https://patientengagementhit.com/news/understanding-stigma-as-a-mental-healthcare-barrier.
69. Patrick W. Corrigan and Amy C. Watson, Understanding the Impact of Stigma on People with
Mental Illness, 1 WORLD PSYCHIATRY at 17 (2002).
70. Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good is Bad, What’s Bad is Good, You’ll Find Out When Reach the
Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything
More than “Idiot Wind?,” 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 236 (2001).
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These misconceptions and unconscious beliefs can have profoundly
harmful effects.71 For example, the child welfare context shows that the freedom
of an individual to choose when and if to have a child is put in jeopardy for
people with disabilities.72 There is a longstanding “underlying belief that persons
with mental disabilities should not reproduce and are inherently unable to
provide proper parenting to their children.”73 The disturbing history of
sterilization of disabled people is the extreme outcome of these beliefs, and other
troubling outcomes persist today.74 Indeed, parents with serious mental illness
lose custody of their children and have their parental rights terminated at
disproportionately high rates despite low rates of child abuse.75 However,
psychotic illness “does not need to interfere with an individual’s ability to be a
good parent”76 given “well-timed, appropriate, and adequate education and
resources.”77 The loss of the right to parent serves as just one example of a tragic
loss of autonomy many people with disabilities face, created by the perfect storm
of stigma, bias, and fear.78
II. THE VALUE OF ANTI-SUBORDINATION
Marginalized groups are subject to overt and covert subordination under the
law and in society.79 Subordination can take the form of discrimination, stigma,
stereotyping, exclusion, and oppression.80 The anti-subordination perspective is
critically important to people with disabilities.81

71. Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Termination of the
Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 387 (2000).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 387-88, 403-04.
74. Id. at 403-04.
75. KATHERINE A. JUDGE, Serving Children, Siblings, and Spouses: Understanding the Needs of
Other Family Members, in HELPING FAMILIES COPE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 161, 164 (Harriet P. Lefley
ed., 1994).
76. Mary V. Seeman, Intervention to Prevent Child Custody Loss in Mothers with Schizophrenia,
2012 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. AND TREATMENT 1 (2012)
77. Id.
78. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS
WITH
DISABILITIES
AND
THEIR
CHILDREN,
(September
27,
2012),
http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/89591c1f_384e_4003_a7ee_0a14ed3e11aa.pdf
(explaining
the differences that parents with disabilities are more likely to face, such as removal of their children,
termination of their parental rights, discrimination is custody, difficulty in accessing assistive reproductive
technology, and face barriers to adoption)
79. See generally Colker, supra note 1 (discussing the subordination of marginalized groups). See
also Colker, supra note 3 (discussing how people with disabilities are impacted by subordination).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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A. The General Anti-Subordination Perspective
Anti-subordination is the idea that groups of people should not be
subordinated to others in society.82 Further, society’s role in historic
subordination should be considered when remediating discrepancies in
treatment.83 Anti-subordination is distinct from anti-differentiation which
supports policies that seek to treat everyone the same, but in practice
disadvantage certain groups.84 The anti-subordination principle articulates the
need for group-specific policies and reforms to redress historic subordination.85
One example of an anti-subordination based policy is affirmative action, which
can seek to redress both the historical and present role of discrimination in
hiring.86 Due to a long history of racial discrimination, group-specific policy
might be necessary to redress the current effects of that past discrimination.87 In
addition, the effects of present discrimination might narrow a pool of applicants,
however affirmative action policies could be enacted to actively seek out groupspecific candidates to address this disparity.88
In her discussion of the formation of Critical Race Theory, Kimberlé
Crenshaw describes the way that subordination occurs in law school:
[t]he wholesale failure to consider the interests of underserved
communities, the failure to interrogate the gaping contradictions
between the formal commitment to the rule of law and the realities of
racial dictatorship through much of the nation’s history, the failure to
reward innovative legal theories or to explore the reformist potential
of legal advocacy-all these features of the pre-civil rights elite legal
education might have been viewed from a position of skepticism given
their collaborative role in normalizing broad scale societal
stratification. That “excellence” and “merit” could be attached to legal
thinking that consistently failed to take up some of the most complex
legal problems in society was troubling enough during segregation’s
tenure, but to effortlessly reproduce these values in a post-segregation
world seemed to undermine rather than enhance the claims of social
progress.89

82. Colker, supra note 3, at 1007.
83. Id. at 1007-10
84. Id. at 1012.
85. Id. at 1015.
86. Id. at 1047.
87. Id. at 1013.
88. Id. at 1047.
89. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 20 Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back To Move
Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1273-74 (2011).
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Adding to the complexity, taking an anti-subordination perspective with
respect to one group might come into conflict with that of another group.90
Intersectional analysis generally seeks to dismantle systems of multiple
oppressions, “[w]here systems of race, gender, and class domination
converge.”91 As Kimberlé Crenshaw notes, “identity politics” fails when “it
frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences.”92 The ‘disability’
grouping exemplifies this entirely – not only is there great diversity in whom is
disabled, there is also tremendous diversity in what disability is. Disability cuts
across lines of race, gender, class, etc., but also encompasses a vast array of
experiences, from physical disability to mental health conditions to neurological
differences.
Therefore, within that diversity, it is perhaps inevitable that there will be
competing goals. Beth Ribet identifies this as ‘disablement,’ and argues that
“[t]here is, as yet, no sustained critical discourse that acknowledges the collective
disablement of subordinated populations, and particularly Communities of
Color, as a figurative, legal, and fully embodied reality in which it is possible to
acknowledge that people are ‘disabled by White supremacy.’”93 This might
present a conflict because the disability-rights focus in moving away from a
medical model of disability might lead to a dismissal of legitimate concerns
about access to health justice.94 Though not the central concern of this article,
this complexity is worthy of acknowledgement and further discussion.
B. Anti-Subordination and Disability
Anti-subordination is typically associated with racial and gender
discrimination and oppression.95 However, Ruth Colker and Samuel Bagenstos
have both applied the idea of anti-subordination to people with disabilities.96 As
Ruth Colker explains it, “[u]nder the anti-subordination perspective, it is
inappropriate for certain groups in society to have subordinated status because
of their lack of power in society as a whole.”97 Furthermore, integration is not

90. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (1991).
91. Id. at 1246.
92. Id. at 1242.
93. Beth Ribet, Surfacing Disability Through A Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 GEO. J. L. &
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 209, 245 (2010).
94. See id. at 245; see also Chandra L. Ford & Collins O. Airhihenbuwa, Critical Race Theory, Race
Equity, and Public Health: Toward Antiracism Praxis, 100(SUPPL 1) AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH (2010)
(arguing that structural racism’s influence on health outcomes are not adequately addressed, and that
“health for all cannot be achieved if structural racisms persists”).
95. See e.g., Colker, supra note 3, at 1011, 1013. (arguing for the use of anti-subordination when
confronted with race and sex issues, especially as it pertains to an equal protection analysis).
96. Id. Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397 (2000).
97. Colker, supra note 3, at 1007.
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the only feature of promoting the dignity of people with disabilities; the value
for some people of separateness must also be respected.98 This includes
“disability-only services and institutions that are available to those who need or
desire them, while also creating safeguards to prevent some people from being
inappropriately coerced into entering disability-only institutions, particularly
residential institutions …”99
Subordination is, in Samuel Bagenstos’s conception, formed from and
given life by stigma against people with disabilities.100 He writes that there are
three “means by which society attaches systematic disadvantage to particular
impairments:” 1. that people with disabilities “constitute an identifiable group of
people who experience similar, systematic obstacles to participation in a range
of activities in public and private life”; 2. that “those obstacles result from
society’s prejudices, stereotyping and neglect”; and 3. that “the very social
practices that attach systematic disadvantage to particular impairments are what
create the category of people with disabilities.”101 Bagenstos writes that stigma
ties these three concepts together; stigma accounts for the historic exclusion of
people with disabilities from public life and society, but also for the “widespread
belief in the ability of modern medicine to enhance our mental and physical
lives,” which means that “the ideological currents that exclude people with
disabilities from our notion of the ‘norm’ stubbornly remain with us.”102
Anti-subordination expresses concerns around inclusion in public life,
access to services, empowerment, and freedom from abuse; it also rejects
concepts of disability as something to be pitied, as a cause that only needs
charity.103 Anti-subordination demands that society see people with disabilities
as individuals and not only as either tragic or inspirational stories.104 This
perspective also captures the move from the medical model of disability to the
social model, which moved the focus of ‘solving’ disability off the individual
and on to the world which frequently fails to accommodate it.105

98. Colker, supra note 1, at 1418.
99. Id. at 1423.
100. Bagenstos, supra note 96.
101. Id. at 436.
102. Id. at 444.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. The difference between the ‘medical model’ and ‘social model’ of disability is essentially the
foundation of disability studies – the shift from viewing disability as a problem within the disabled person
to viewing it as a problem with a society that fails to accommodate that person was the crucial move.
“Disability Studies . . . stands in sharp contrast to the study of disability which focuses on the person with
a disability as one with medical, physiological, anatomical, psychological and functional pathologies that
originate in the body or mind of the person. By contrast, Disability Studies embodies values based on
viewing the person with a disability not as a victim of pathology, but as one who is limited more by social
attitudes and environmental barriers than any inherent ‘defect’ or ;deficiency’ within the person that must
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However, while anti-subordination may provide solutions to some of the
problems people with disabilities face, the inclusion of disability is clearly an
afterthought. For example, while “a number of the founders of Critical Race
Studies (CRS) have articulated a praxis and methodology acutely focused on
race, and also intently conscious of intersectionality,” it is nonetheless the case
that “[r]elatively few CRS authors have explicitly taken up the challenge of
articulating disability in CRS scholarship.”106 Indeed, Ruth Colker wrote about
anti-subordination as applied to sex and race in 1986,107 and only applied it to
disability twenty year later.108
Beth Ribet identifies this problem and argues that disability should be
brought ‘into the fold’ of critical race theory.109 And, it is true that the historically
“strong association between disease and deformity and racial images and
ideologies” is pernicious in that it is used as “evidence of supposed gender, racial,
cultural or class inferiority.”110 Ribet astutely acknowledges that there is more to
the intersection of race and disability than just the reinforcing or intensifying of
stereotypes.111
However, disability legal studies must go even further than that. Certainly,
siloed categorization is not the goal here. This Article’s quarrel is not with the
idea that dissecting intersecting oppressions is worthwhile. Instead, this Article
argues that anti-subordination is not sufficient to fully understand disability. To
the extent that disability is theorized, it must be theorized alongside other
oppressions, but also on its own terms. This is where the next section is germane
– understanding the anti-eliminationist perspective.
III. THE VALUE OF ANTI-ELIMINATIONISM
Anti-eliminationism is the perspective that society should not seek to
eliminate people with disabilities.112 Then, it goes one step further to assert that
disability itself should not be eliminated. While we might have moved away from
the idea that people with disabilities should be removed from society and towards
be remedied.” Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: Whats Disability Studies Got To Do With It Or An Introduction
To Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 402, 409 (2011).
106. Ribet, supra note 93, at 209.
107. See Colker, supra note 3.
108. Colker, supra note 1, at 1418.
109. See Ribet, supra note 93, at 245.
110. Id. at 213.
111. Id. at 210.
112. As used in this article, ‘eliminationism’ is defined as “any set of policies, beliefs, and actions that
serve to eliminate disability or advocate for its elimination”. See infra note 113 for the source of this
definition. This is distinct from the definition of eliminationism related to genocide; for that definition,
see e.g. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault
on Humanity. Nevertheless, the terms share commonalities; for example, the five tools of eliminationism
in that context are identified by Goldhagen as transformation through suppression, repression, expulsion,
prevention of reproduction, and extermination. Id.
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an integrationist perspective, the idea that disability is inherently bad is still
prevalent. Anti-eliminationism seeks to preserve dignity, resources, and support
for people with disabilities, while also acknowledging and celebrating the
diversity that disability itself brings to society.
A. Eliminationism: A Particular Problem for People with Disabilities
Eliminationism,113 for the purposes of this article, is any set of policies,
beliefs, and actions that serve to eliminate disability or advocate for its
elimination.114 It is the confluence of factors that combine to reduce the instance
of disability in society.
Eliminationism need not be intentionally directed at people with
disabilities, yet that is how it is often experienced. At its core, it is different from
subordination both in degree and in kind. Anti-eliminationism activism has life
and death at stake, but is also frequently pitted against rational justification
arguments rather than pernicious stereotyping.115
Within disability-rights groups, there is growing concern about issues of
eliminationism.116 These groups have taken the position that anti-eliminationism
must be a central component of their advocacy, because it addresses substantial
issues that anti-subordination does not: namely, that much of the public sees
eliminating disability as a ‘good,’117 while many disability rights activists
disagree.118 While an anti-subordination perspective might seek to raise up
113. See Melissa McEwan’s use of the term ‘eliminationism’ in the context of fat-hatred, which is the
first use of the term the author has come across outside of writings on genocide. See Melissa McEwan,
On
Fat
Hatred
and
Eliminationism,
SHAKESVILLE
(Sept.
2,
2011),
http://www.shakesville.com/2011/09/on-fat-hatred-and-eliminationism.html (discussing the use of the
term ‘eliminationism’ in the context of fat-hatred, as opposed to genocide).
114. While this argument is not within the scope of this Article, it is readily acknowledged that other
marginalized groups face existential threats as well. The distinction is that people with disabilities feel
they are purposefully targeted with the explicit support of society; see infra section IV. C for the discussion
on physician-assisted suicide and more on this idea. However, an anti-eliminationist critique might tie
back to critical race theory in the way that anti-subordination theory ties forward to disability. Scholars
have noted the attack on black lives in similar fashion; see Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography
and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me In the Legal Academy, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE 490 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds. 2000) for a discussion of the death
penalty as applied to black defendants as just one example.
115. See e.g. discussion of Assisted Suicide in this article for further discussion on the interplay
between rational justifications and stereotyping arguments.
116. See NOT DEAD YET, notdeadyet.org (opposing assisted suicide and euthanasia as “deadly forms
of discrimination.”),
117. See Harlan D. Hahn & Todd L. Belt, Disability Identity and Attitudes Toward Cure in a Sample
of Disabled Activists, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 453, 461-62 (2004).
118. See Not Dead Yet Disability Activists Oppose Assisted Suicide As A Deadly Form of
Discrimination, NOT DEAD YET, notdeadyet.org/assisted-suicide-talking-points for a discussion, which
states that “[s]ome people fear disability as a fate worse than death. Proponents of legalized assisted
suicide are willing to treat lives ended through assisted suicide coercion and abuse as ‘acceptable losses’
when balanced against their unwillingness to accept disability or responsibility for their own suicide.” Id.
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people with disabilities in society, it is ultimately silent on whether disability is,
or can be, a neutral proposition in a fully accessible world.
If anti-subordination theory promotes the idea that people with disabilities
should be actively included in society through deliberate measures and free from
abuse and stigma, then anti-eliminationism argues that disability should not be
eradicated entirely from society. This is not just a point about people who
currently have a disability, although that is part of the argument, it also extends
to potential people with disabilities.119 This potential is both (1) potential people
with disabilities, or those who are currently able-bodied, but who may become
disabled later; and (2) potential people, meaning those people who have not been
born yet, and who may never be born. Disability is “a natural part of the human
experience.”120 The range of ways that able-bodied people might suddenly find
themselves disabled is vast, from accidental injuries resulting in physical
impairments, to substance use disorders, mental illness, and degenerative
diseases.
The idea that we should strive to eliminate disability, however, is in some
respects founded on the notion that a life with a disability may not be worth
living, or at least is ‘meaningless’ with a ‘dismal forecast.’121 One formulation
of this view has been expressed by Harriet McBryde Johnson, a disability rights
lawyer, who wrote that [those who promote the idea that living with a disability
is not a life worth living think]:
it would have been better, all things considered, to have given my
parents the option of killing the baby I once was, and to let other
parents kill similar babies as they come along, and thereby avoid the
suffering that comes with lives like mine… The presence or absence
of disability doesn’t predict quality of life.122
In contrast, anti-eliminationism endorses the affirmation of life with
disabilities, not only as freedom from abuse, but also as affirmatively worthwhile
in spite of and because of disability.
Only certain disabilities, or certain groups of people with disabilities, are
typically ‘targeted’ for removal from society. Which groups are targeted is of
grave concern, because ‘eliminating’ disability disproportionately harms lowincome people, and people already living with disabilities:
Persons or families with disabled children have claimed that a policy that
encourages prebirth genetic deselection of persons with disabilities is a public
statement that the lives of the disabled are worth less than those of the ablebodied. In addition, such a policy reduces the number of persons with those
disabilities, thus reducing their political effectiveness. . . . In short, it engenders
119.
120.
121.
122.

See e.g. infra Section IV.E.
42 U.S.C.A § 15001 (A)(1) (WEST. 2000).
Harriet McBryde Johnson, Unspeakable Conversations, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, (Feb. 16, 2003).
Id.
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or reinforces public perceptions that the disabled should not exist, making
intolerance and discrimination toward them more likely.123
If it is true that only a portion of disability can be eliminated, then it may
be that the people with the least resources will be the most affected. On the other
side of this issue are health advocates who say that we must strive to make life
better for all, if we can.124 For some, this could mean the prevention of
disability.125 There has also been scholarship focused on intentionally creating
children with disabilities, and whether this is an ethical choice.126 While these
approaches are not the focus of this article, an anti-eliminationist critique may
have something to say about parents with disabilities who want to have children
with their same disability, if such a position is in fact prevalent.127
B. Filling the Anti-Subordination Gap with Anti-Eliminationism
The key component that is missing from much of the disability law
literature is an understanding of the anti-eliminationism perspective. The most
prolific writing on the issue has been in specific reference to two areas, discussed
in the Case Studies infra: physician-assisted suicide and reproductive/prenatal
testing. However, there are other areas that warrant an anti-eliminationism
analysis, and more that may emerge.128 A more comprehensive understanding
and analysis of this position is therefore warranted.
The experience of people with disabilities confronting eliminationism can
be seen as pitting the drive to live an autonomous life against a message that such
a life might not be worth living. Nonetheless, the policies that enact
eliminationist perspectives are usually at least facially neutral, if not intended to
help people with disabilities. As discussed infra, assisted suicide laws do not
explicitly state that their goal is to eliminate people with disabilities, even if that
is how the effect is felt by people with disabilities.129
As Arlene Kanter identifies, disability studies generally, “infuses the legal
academy [with] a perspective of those who are routinely made invisible and
123. John Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B. U. L. REV. 421, 423 (1996).
124. See Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 347 (2008) (identifying that some bioethicists argue that intentional disability is always
harmful).
125. Id. at 349.
126. Id; Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 299 (2008).
127. See e.g. Darshak M. Sanghavi, Wanting Babies Like Themselves, Some Parents Choose Genetic
Defects, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/health/05essa.html?_r=0
(detailing parental choices in selecting children with disabilities). The anti-eliminationist perspective
might be to enhance choice along these lines.
128. See infra IV.C. and IV.E.
129. See infra Part IV.C. But see Peter Singer, PRACTICAL ETHICS 184 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d
ed. 1995). The exception to this may be Peter Singer, who has (quite controversially) contended that
parents may be morally justified in killing some infants at birth who are severely disabled.
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marginalized, just as feminist legal studies and critical race theory did before it
for other groups.”130 For Kanter, this means viewing the person with a disability
“as one who is limited more by social attitudes and environmental barriers than
any inherent ‘defect’ or ‘deficiency’ within the person that must be remedied.”131
This article suggests that, even more than that contribution, disability law must
go further, and take into account the potentially anti-disability forces of
subordination and eliminationism.
IV. A CONFLICT OF VALUES
Autonomy, anti-subordination, and anti-eliminationism are each crucial
pieces of a well-developed theory of disability law. However, they are often in
tension. This section will provide concrete examples of those tensions, advocate
for increased scrutiny in these areas, and propose some preliminary solutions.132
The first section here will provide examples of eliminationism in the
context of access to healthcare, in order to illustrate that this problem has yet to
be solved.133
Next, the second and third examples involve a person with a disability
acting autonomously, expressing a wish to exercise autonomy in a manifestly

130. Kanter, supra note 105, at 405-06.
131. Id. at 409.
132. THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL TENSION, NOT FULLY EXPLORED IN THIS ARTICLE, WHICH IS BETWEEN
A PERSON WITH A DISABILITY AND A PERSON ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF. SEE E.G. JENNIFER J. MONTHIE,
THE MYTH OF LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: GUARDIANSHIP IN NEW YORK STATE 80 ALB. LAW. REV. 947
(2016-17); DUSTIN RYNDERS, SUPPORTING ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES TO AVOID UNNECESSARY
GUARDIANSHIP 55-FEB HOUS. LAW. 26 (2018); LESLIE SALZMAN, USING DOMESTIC LAW TO MOVE
TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF UNIVERSAL LEGAL CAPACITY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 521 (2017).
As discussed supra in Section I, the emphasis on ‘rationality’ in autonomy can cut out of decision-making
some people with disabilities who act or think ‘irrationally’. If the law then places another individual in
charge of decision-making, there is frequently conflict on a number of fronts.
First, the decisions themselves may be contested: the person with a disability wants one thing, while the
legal guardian decides to do another. Ideally in this scenario, the guardian is sensitive to a wide array of
issues such as the nature of that person’s disability and the importance of trying to honor their wishes.
Inevitably, however, there will be times when a guardian makes a decision with which the person with a
disability disagrees. What then? What values can the person with a disability appeal to when their
autonomy is removed?
The second conflict here is that we can readily imagine scenarios where a guardian might be either
ignorant, lazy, biased, or actively malicious. When one person has that level of control over the fate of
another, abuse of power is inevitable, even with legal safeguards in place.
Finally, the exercise of guardianship procedures might be seen as an eliminationist move, in that the voices
of people with disabilities will necessarily be diminished. Is there another way to account for, care for,
and protect people with profound disabilities who truly cannot make necessary decisions?
These conflicts are unfortunately left unresolved here, as they are outside the scope of this particular
Article.
133. See infra Section IV.A. (detailing the problem of access to health care).
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concrete way – by choosing to die, or choosing to engage in sexual activity.134
These examples also have in common that a disability-rights-focused perspective
may run counter to the manifestation of that autonomy. In the case of sexual
activity, anti-subordination’s concern with the potential for abuse, exploitation,
and the difficulty in determining true consent is examined.135 In the case of
physician-assisted suicide, it is a death that is being faced, and antieliminationism weighs towards at least discouraging that death, if not more136
Finally, the fourth and fifth examples take a look at actors who make
decisions on behalf of people with disabilities. These actors, as decision-makers,
make decisions that can subject people with disabilities to subordination, or
involve a choice about whether or not to produce a child with a disability. These
decision-makers may or may not have disabilities themselves, which may affect
their decision-making. However, the salient disabled person in these cases is the
object of the decision: the disabled child, or the potential child.137
A. Problems with Access to Healthcare
The resistance that some people with disabilities experience when
attempting to access healthcare fits squarely within an anti-eliminationist
critique. People with disabilities should be afforded the same access to healthcare
as others, but are frequently denied it.138
One example is organ transplantation for people with intellectual and
developmental disabilities.139 A policy brief published in March 2013 by the
Autistic Self Advocacy Network (ASAN) identified discriminatory practices
which deny people with disabilities from receiving necessary organ
transplants.140 An example given in the brief identifies a woman with Down
syndrome who was denied a heart and lung transplant by two hospitals.141 One
134. See infra Section IV.B. and IV.C. (detailing examples of autonomous choice by people with
disabilities).
135. Two other related issues along these dimensions include the controversy within the deaf
community over cochlear implants for the profoundly deaf, see e.g. Lydia Denworth, Science Gave my
Son the Gift of Sound, TIME April 25, 2014, especially “A Cure or A Genocide?”,
https://time.com/76154/deaf-culture-cochlear-implants/, and California law AB 1014, which authorizes
courts to issue Gun Violence Restraining Orders to remove an otherwise legally-owned gun from an
individual who exhibits certain behaviors associated with mental illness, 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 872
(A.B. 1014) (WEST).
136. See infra Section IV.C. (detailing choice as imposed on a person with disabilities).
137. See infra Section IV.D. and IV.E.
138. See e.g. Ari Ne’eman et al., Organ Transplantation and People with I/DD: A Review of Research,
Policy
and
Next
Steps
(March
2013),
AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK
http://autisticadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ASAN-Organ-Transplantation-PolicyBrief_3.18.13.pdf. (describing organ transpalant policies that discriminate against people with certain
disabilities)
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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hospital stated that such transplants were categorically inappropriate for people
with Down syndrome, and the other hospital did not find any medical reason to
refuse the transplant, but denied her because it concluded that “her condition
made her unable to follow the complex post-transplantation medical regiment
that would be required of her.”142
The problem combines the most pernicious aspects of stigma, stereotyping,
and bias: the idea that people with disabilities either aren’t ‘worthy’ of life-saving
transplants or wouldn’t be able to ‘handle’ them anyway.143 This concern is born
out by a recent letter sent to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), signed by 30 members of the U.S. House of
Representatives, which “urged the agency to address what they called
‘persistent’ organ transplant discrimination.”144
Indeed, as recently as September 2018, a complaint was lodged with the
OCR indicating that the University of North Carolina Health Care system denied
“a person with intellectual disability the opportunity to be placed on a transplant
list.”145 The complaint alleged that:
an individual with an intellectual disability was in need of a heart
transplant, but a doctor on staff at UNC Health Care determined that they were
not a good candidate for heart transplant because of their developmental learning
disabilities and because they do not live independently. The complainant
asserted that without the transplant, they would eventually die.146
B. Consent to Sexual Activity
Gaining sexual autonomy has long been a struggle for people with
disabilities.147 People with intellectual disabilities in particular face assumptions
142. Id.
143. Id. See also Michelle Diament, Disability No Reason to Deny Organ Transplants, Lawmakers
Say, DISABILITYSCOOP, (Oct. 24, 2016) (describing an effort by members of the U.S. House of
Representatives to urge the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to cease the practice of
discrimination against people with disabilities in organ transplant).
144. Diament, supra note 143.
145. Shaun Heasley, Feds: Patient with Intellectual Disability Blocked From Organ Transplant List,
DISABILITY SCOOP (February 18, 2019), http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2019/02/18/feds-blockedtransplant-list/26055.
146. Press Release, HHS Press Office, OCR Resolves Disability Complaint of Individual Who Was
Denied the Opportunity for Heart Transplant List Placement (February 12, 2019),
http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/02/12/ocr-resolves-disability-complaint-individual-who-wasdenied-opportunity-heart-transplant-list.html.
147. See generally MICHAEL GILL, ALREADY DOING IT: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND SEXUAL
AGENCY (2015).
A related issue, though not the focus of this paper, is the struggle to gain the autonomy, freedom, and right
to bear and raise children. The Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) upheld the
compulsory sterilization of the ‘unfit,’ including people with (or alleged to have) intellectual disabilities.
See also Beth Ribet, Surfacing Disability Through A Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 GEO. J.L. &
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 209 (2010) for issues relating to the use of the disability label as a weapon
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that they are ‘child-like’ and not desirous of sexual lives, or that they should be
‘protected from themselves’ if they are.148 One variation of this stereotype is that
people with intellectual disabilities are “uncontrollably and inappropriately
sexual.”149
Adults living with Down syndrome frequently experience these
assumptions and stereotypes.150 According to the National Down Syndrome
Society,”[i]n the past, sexuality was not considered an issue for any people with
Down syndrome because of the inaccurate belief that intellectual disability
(formerly known as mental retardation) produced permanent childhood. In fact,
all people with Down syndrome have sexual feelings and intimacy needs.”151
Moreover, people with Down syndrome struggle to gain acceptance when
they engage in romantic and sexual relationships.152 In contrast, when
competency to consent along with an acknowledgement of sexual desire are
presumed absent, sexual encounters with people with disabilities are
“automatically assumed to be assault – they have to be proven otherwise in
criminal and legal mechanisms”.153
Adding further complexity, ableism in this context is linked to
heteronormativity.154 Robert McRuer tracks the visibility of disability (or of
‘crips’ in his terminology) with the visibility of queerness, arguing that the
of sexual oppression. Buck v. Bell has never been overturned; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
limited the scope of some compulsory sterilization laws, but did not directly comment on sterilization of
the disabled. In fact, involuntary sterilization still occurs. As recently as 2014, a 20-year-old man with an
intellectual disability had to sue to prevent his mother from having a doctor perform an involuntary
vasectomy on him. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa, 2014) (holding that Court-approved
involuntary vasectomies would be acceptable under certain circumstances; it was that the man’s mother
had neglected to seek a judicial order first that was the problem).
Furthermore, once a child is born to someone with a disability, there is frequent state intervention to
discourage or prevent that parenting relationship. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE
CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN, (September 27,
2012),
http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/89591c1f_384e_4003_a7ee_0a14ed3e11aa.pdf
(explaining the differences that parents with disabilities are more likely to face, such as removal of their
children, termination of their parental rights, discrimination is custody, difficulty in accessing assistive
reproductive technology, and face barriers to adoption). See also Joint Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Just.
& Health and Hum. Services To Interim Comm’r Erin Deveney, (Jan. 29, 2015) (describing the bias in
the Massachusetts child welfare system against parents with disabilities, and asserting that the Americans
with Disabilities Act applies in the child welfare law context), https://www.ada.gov/ma_docf_lof.pdf.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 30.
150. See
Sexuality
&
Down
Syndrome,
NAT’L
DOWN
SYNDROME
SOC’Y,
https://www.ndss.org/resources/sexuality/.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g. Clair Pullen, Couples with Down Syndrome Don’t Need To Be Sterilized, They Need
Support, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, (October 6, 2016) https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/couples-withdown-syndrome-dont-need-to-be-sterilised-they-need-support-20161005-grv6no.html (describing two
adults with Down syndrome whose parents sought to have them forcibly sterilized).
153. Gill, supra note 147.
154. MCGRUER, supra note 8.
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system of compulsory of able-bodiedness that produces disability is interwoven
with and dependent on the system of compulsory heterosexuality that produces
queerness.155 This system is dependent on able bodies being ‘invisible’ in the
same way that heterosexuality is: it is the default, the assumption, and not worthy
of note.156 When disabled bodies are by contrast visible, they are visible for their
difference, and therefore are seen as having something different about their
sexuality too.157
Paternalistic over-protection on the one hand, at the expense of inhibiting
sexual autonomy, is contrasted with the high risks of exploitation, a concern of
anti-subordination.158 People with disabilities, and women with disabilities in
particular, are subject to high rates of sexual abuse; some estimates put the rate
at 80% of women with intellectual disabilities abused in their lifetime.159 Not
only are people with disabilities more than twice as likely to be victims of violent
crime as people without disabilities, people with disabilities are more than three
times as likely to be the victims of serious violent crime (rape or sexual assault,
robbery, and aggravated assault) as people without disabilities.160
Undoubtedly, protection from sexual assault must be a priority, and any
group sexually assaulted at such an alarming rate urgently needs that protection.
How to address this problem, “without making the victims symbols of
humiliation,” while also acknowledging the “social forces such as ableism,
racism, classism, and sexism that portray women with intellectual disabilities as
warranting special treatment,”161 is the challenge here.

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. See also Sexual Assault Within Underserved Populations, THE WASH. COAL. OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT PROGRAMS, https://www.wcsap.org/help/about-sexual-assault/how-often-does-it-happen (last
visited April 1, 2019) (providing data on the high risk of sexual assault among people with disabilities,
particularly people with development disabilities).
159. According to some sources, 80% of women and 30% of men with intellectual disabilities have
been sexually assaulted, and 50% of those women were assaulted more than ten times. Sexual Assault
Within Underserved Populations, THE WASH. COAL. OF SEXUAL ASSAULT PROGRAMS,
https://www.wcsap.org/help/about-sexual-assault/how-often-does-it-happen (last visited April 1, 2019);
DISABILITY JUSTICE, SEXUAL ABUSE https://disabilityjustice.org/sexual-abuse; DISABLED WORLD,
PEOPLE
WITH
DISABILITIES
AND
SEXUAL
ASSAULT,
https://www.disabledworld.com/disability/sexuality/assaults.php#ixzz2SXMEQWra. The rates of abuse may also be higher for
physical disabilities; for example, 54% of boys who are Deaf have been sexually abused, compared to
10% of boys who are hearing, and 50% of girls who are Deaf have been sexually abused, compared to
25% of girls who are hearing. See also Patricia Sullivan et al., Sexual Abuse of Deaf Youth, 132 AM ANN
DEAF 256 (1987).
160. Crime Against Persons with Disabilities, 2009-2014 Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
(2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/capd0914st_sum.pdf.
161. Gill, supra note 147, at 23.
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One proposal is to adjust the concern with consent by centering a concern
about exploitation.162 H. Matthews defines abuse as based on the presence of
exploitation – this is helpful “because it moves away from the albeit crucial issue
of consent and indicates that although a person with learning disabilities may
have been willing to engage in sexual contact, they may still have been abused,
because of the position or motivation of the other person.”163 This focus on
exploitation rather than consent recognizes that there may be an “unequal power
dynamic” that favors “professionals, family members and staff,” which can lead
to sexual violence.164
An exploitation analysis would be an anti-subordination-based response to
the problem in that it could allow people with intellectual disabilities, for
example, to engage in romantic and/or sexual relationships without turning them
into “symbols of humiliation” or seeing them as “warranting special
treatment.”165
Take the case of State v. Fourtin, in which Richard Fourtin was accused of
sexually assaulting a woman with cerebral palsy and hydrocephalus who used a
wheelchair.166 The decision focused on the consent issue – it appeared to the
Connecticut Appellate Court that the alleged victim was capable of consent
because she had a history of “registering displeasure” through “biting, kicking
and scratching.”167
If the focus of that decision had been on exploitation - rather than capacity
to consent - it may have come out differently. Prosecutors argued in the case that
the alleged victim (referred to as “L.K.”) was “physically helpless.”168 The
finding of physical helplessness was necessary for Fourtin’s conviction under the
Connecticut statute for sexual assault in the second and fourth degrees.169
Physical helplessness is defined as “unconscious or for any other reason…
physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.”170
The Connecticut Court was probably correct that under the statute, L.K. did
not meet the definition of physically helpless171 If she was capable of
communicating her unwillingness to an act, essentially, she was capable of

162. Michelle McCarthy & David Thompson, Sexual Abuse by Design: An Examination of the Issues
in Learning Disability Services, 11 DISABILITY AND SOC’Y 205, 206 (1996).
163. Id.
164. Gill, supra note 147, at 34.
165. Id. .
166. State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d. 674 (Conn. 2012)
167. Id. at 677;. see also Joseph Fischel & Hilary O’Connell, Disabling Consent, Or Reconstructing
Sexual Autonomy, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 428, 429 (2016) (describing the Fourtin case and decision).
168. Id; Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 167, at 474.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d. 674 (Conn. 2012).
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consent (or, as the case may be, non-consent).172 Perhaps, then, the issue was the
charging statute; why not prosecute Fourtin under a rape statute without the
‘physical helplessness’ dimension? There were two other options in the case
available to prosecutors: The general sexual assault statute, which requires proof
of physical force, and a sexual assault statute that relates to victims determined
to be “mentally defective.”173 Since L.K.’s disability rendered it unnecessary to
use physical force to assault her, the only other option available to prosecutors
would have been to prove she was ‘mentally defective.’174
After the case and directly in response to it, 2012 statutory revisions added
a provision regarding when a victim’s ability to consent is impaired “because of
mental disability.”175 This also seems unsatisfactory.. If a person were covered
by this statute it is true that their lack of consent, if present, would be accounted
for; however, it also removes any possibility for their sexual autonomy, or
“wanted sexual contact.”176 Perhaps it would not be necessary to remove a
victim’s agency, her ability to consent, if the law allowed the Court to focus on
exploitation instead. An affirmative-consent standard might also be helpful by
allowing the court to inquire as to whether the victim expressed any willingness
to engage in the sexual encounter; rather than only considering evidence of her
unwillingness.177
C. Physician-Assisted Suicide
Ben Mattlin, in an op-ed for the New York Times about a proposed assistedsuicide law in Massachusetts, explained the problem:
I’ve lived so close to death for so long that I know how thin and porous the
border between coercion and free choice is, how easy it is for someone to
inadvertently influence you to feel devalued and hopeless – to pressure you ever
so slightly but decidedly into being ‘reasonable,’ to unburdening others, to
‘letting go.’178
Mattlin, born with spinal muscular atrophy, takes the position of many
disability rights advocates that “right to die” legislation is fraught with the
potential for abuse, too wrapped up in the everyday coercion and social pressure

172. Id.
173. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(4) (West 2015); See also Fischel & O’Connell, supra note
169, at 479 (describing the law at issue in Fourtin).
174. Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 167.
175. Id. at 480-81.
176. Id. at 482.
177. Id. at 493. It is worth noting that a focus on exploitation would not necessarily be radical, as much
of criminal law maintains a mens rea element that looks to what was inside the defendant’s mind at the
time an act was committed.
178. Ben Mattlin, Suicide by Choice? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Oct. 31 2012)
https://nyti.ms/Y2AI3p.
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for disabled people to end their lives.179 After all, “Who chooses suicide in a
vacuum?”180
What greater expression of truly ‘owning one’s life’ could there be than
deciding the place and manner of one’s own death? In that sense, suicide is the
ultimate expression of autonomy. Sylvia Law writes, “the right to choice is
valuable, however that choice is exercised. The dying patient has lost control of
most significant aspects of his or her life. The assurances that assisted death is
an option provides a measure of autonomy and control, however that autonomy
is exercised.”181
This notion is contrasted with concerns about coercion based on societal
stigma and bias.182183 The debate sets up a real problem for assisted suicide laws.
Robert Burt writes that we should be skeptical of these laws because “we fool
ourselves if we think that patient control - that the self-determination ideal - is
an adequate corrective to these abuses. We fool ourselves if we imagine that this
ideal does not carry its own dark implications.”184
Physician-assisted suicide is currently legal in California,185 Colorado,186
Hawaii,187 Maine,188 Oregon,189 Vermont,190 Washington,191 Montana,192 and
Washington D.C.193 A law is pending in New Jersey194 These statutes195
typically rely on doctors’ determinations that a person has a terminal illness, and
a voluntarily expressed wish to receive medication that will end the person’s life.

179. See generally Id (arguing against assisted-suicide laws from a disability-rights perspective).
180. Id.
181. Sylvia Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay On Constitutional Rights and Remedies, 55 MD.
L. REV. 292, 298-99 (1996).
182. Samuel Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 425, 426 (2006)
(“societal stigmas and other social pressures effectively coerce people into making decisions that reflect
biases against people with disabilities”).
183. Robert Burt, Rationality and Injustice in Physician-Assisted Suicide, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
353 (1997).
184. Burt, supra note 14.
185. END OF LIFE OPTION ACT, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443-444.12.
186. Colorado End of Life Options Act, Proposition 106.
187. Our Care, Our Choice Act, HRS § 327L-1.
188. Maine Death with Dignity Act.
189. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. ST. § 127.800.
190. Patient Choice at End of Life Act, VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18 §§ 5291-5293 (2019).
191. the Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010-70.245.903 (2019).
192. Baxter v. Montana, 354 Mont. 234 (Mont. 2009).
193. District of Columbia Death with Dignity Act of 2016 D.C. Law 21-182.
194. Assemb. B. 1504, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); the law is pending a court
challenge. See https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/new-jersey/.
195. The majority of the states have passed statutes. The exception is Montana, referenced in note 194,
where PAS is legal by order of the court.
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This is of particular concern for people with disabilities, who make up a large
subset of people requesting access to lethal prescriptions.196
For example, the Oregon statute provides:
(1) An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be
suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed
his or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for
the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner
in accordance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897.
(2) No person shall qualify under the provisions of ORS
127.800 to 127.897 solely because of age or disability.197
While this statute contains a requirement for a referral for counseling
if the physician determines the patient may have a psychiatric disorder
or depression causing impaired judgment, there is no requirement for
any standard depression screening or mental health evaluation.198
Disability rights groups have argued that people with disabilities,
particularly those who are identified as ‘terminal,’ are more likely to
experience feelings of depression, of being a burden, and other mental
states that might be alleviated with services or other interventions.199
The opposition to assisted suicide legalization has been framed as an
effort to “oppose of assisted suicide and euthanasia as deadly forms of
discrimination.”200
There is data to support the proposition that these laws may harm people
with disabilities. One issue is the problematic identification of ‘terminal’
patients,201 and Oregon’s data confirms that ‘non-terminal’ people with
196. Oregon Public Health Division Report: “Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act – 2014,” OR. PUB.
HEALTH
DIV.,
http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Do
cuments/year17.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
197. OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, OR. REVISED STAT. §127.805 S 2.01.
198. Id. at 127.825 § 3.03.
199. Not Yet Dead Disability Activists Oppose Assisted Suicide As A Deadly Form Of Discrimination,
NOT YET DEAD, http://notdeadyet.org/assisted-suicide-talking-points (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
200. Id.
201. They rely on a prediction of what will be a ‘terminal’ illness by a doctor, which could be flawed.
E.B. Lamont et al., Some Elements Of Prognosis In Terminal Cancer, ONCOLOGY (HUNTINGTON), 11651170 (1999); M. Maltoni, et al., Clinical Prediction Of Survival Is More Accurate Than The Karnofsky
Performance Status In Estimating Lifespan Of Terminally-Ill Cancer Patients, EUR. J. OF CANCER, 76466 (1994); N.A. Christakis and T.J. Iwashyna, Attitude and Self-Reported Practice Regarding
Prognostication in a National Sample of Internists, ARCHIVES. OF INTERNAL MED., 2389-95 (1998).; J.
Lynn et al., Prognoses Of Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients On The Days Before Death: Implications
For Patient Care And Public Policy, NEW HORIZONS, 56-61 (1997).
“17 percent of patients [outlived their prognosis] in the Christakis study. This roughly coincides with data
collected by the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization, which in 2007 showed that 13 percent
of hospice patients around the country outlived their six-month prognoses. … When a group of researchers
looked specifically at patients with three chronic conditions—pulmonary disease, heart failure, and severe
liver disease—they found that many more people outlived their prognosis than in the Christakis study.
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disabilities have received lethal prescriptions.202 Ninety one percent of people
requesting lethal medications in Oregon reportedly made their request due to
“loss of autonomy” (emphasis added).203 To return to this Article’s main concern,
‘owning one’s life’ in this context is in direct potential conflict with antieliminationism.
Solutions to these concerns could be as simple as additional regulatory
measures.204 According to disability rights advocates, however, this is not
sufficient.205 For them, only a complete ban on physician-assisted suicide is
sufficient.206 The dangers of exploitation, coercion, misdiagnosis, and suicide
based on depression or feelings of being a burden, are too high.207
On the other hand, as with many outlawed practices, a ‘ban’ in law means
unregulated action in practice. If the practice were again illegal, it might
“continue illicitly and without institutional safeguards.”208 Sylvia Law argues
that such a ban would parallel pre-legalization abortion, where “abortions were
performed, but because they were illegal, they were costly, clandestine, and often
of poor quality.”209 Nevertheless, disability activists say, the risks and problems
of legalized physician-assisted suicide outweigh the risks and problems of an
illegal status.210 Moreover, the message that is sent by legal physician-assisted

Fully 70 percent of the 900 patients eligible for hospice care lived longer than six months, according to a
1999 paper published in the Journal of the American Medical Association.” Nina Shapiro, Terminal
Uncertainty, SEATTLE WEEKLY (2009), http://archive.seattleweekly.com/2009-01-14/news/terminaluncertainty/.
202. The state report reveals that people outlived the six-month ‘terminal’ prognosis regularly, based
on the time lapse between the person’s request for assisted suicide and their death. The reported time
lapses ranged up to 1009 days. Oregon Public Health Report supra note 198.
203. Supra note 196.
204. See supra note 197. Oregon already allows physicians to ask for a psychological consult, for
example, where necessary; one could imagine a requirement for a depression screening for every person
seeking physician-assisted suicide.
205. Assisted Suicide Laws, DISABILITY RIGHTS EDU. & DEFENSE FUND, dredf.org/publicpolicy/assisted-suicide.
206. The Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF) “opposes the legalization of assisted
suicide and euthanasia.” The group argues that “[l]egalization is a serious mistake for many reasons that
are not always immediately apparent. Supporters often focus solely on issues of choice and selfdetermination, but actually, legalization would restrict choice and self-determination. . . It is imperative
to distinguish personal wishes from the significant dangers to society of legalizing assisted suicide as
public policy.” Id.
207. So-Called Safeguards and Minimal Oversight: The Assisted Suicide Law In Oregon, DISABILITY
RIGHTS EDU. & DEFENSE FUND, dredf.org/public-policy/assisted-suicide/Oregon-so-called-safeguardsand-minimal-data.
208. Law, supra note 181, at 310.
209. Id. at n. 87.
210. Disability Rights Toolkit for Advocacy Against Legalization of Assisted Suicide, NOT DEAD YET
http://notdeadyet.org/disability-rights-toolkit-for-advocacy-against-legalization-of-assisted-suicide.

2019]

DISABLED AUTONOMY

273

suicide is in some ways just as important for activists: these laws indicate to them
that the state itself is saying that disabled lives are not worth living.211
D. Neurodiversity, Anti-Autism, and the Deaf response to cochlear implants
The next example of the tension between autonomy and anti-subordination
comes from Autistic activists arguing against what they see as “anti-Autism”
rhetoric.212 One visible example comes from the anti-vaccination movement,
which has had as one of its driving forces the now-discredited study linking
vaccines to Autism.213 The contention has been that parents should choose to
avoid vaccines in order to protect the health of their children – and avoid
Autism.214 While the science has seemingly moved on, some parents have not; a
Pew study found that almost one in ten Americans do not believe vaccines are
safe,215 and a small internet survey in 2015 found that one in five people aged
18-29 believe that vaccines cause autism.216
However, the anti-vaccination movement is not the only place that antiAutism rhetoric is prominent. Some parents’ organizations have compared
having a child with Autism to having a child stolen from them, or losing a child
to a deadly disease.217 Part of the problem here, and perhaps a solution, is
representation.218 Many Autistics argue that they should be included at every
level of advocacy and research about autism.
While it is not clear exactly how many parents may not be vaccinating their
children due to specific concerns about Autism,219 they do generally have a legal
211. See Id. (writing that “some people get suicide prevention while others get suicide assistance, and
the difference between the two groups is the health status of the individual, leading to a two-tiered system
that results in death to the socially devalued group. This is blatant discrimination.”).
212. See, e.g., Sarah Kurchak, I’m Autistic, and Believe Me, It’s a Lot Better Than Measles, THE
ARCHIPELAGO (2015), https://medium.com/the-archipelago/im-autistic-and-believe-me-its-a-lot-betterthan-measles-78cb039f4bea.
213. Clyde Haberman, A Discredited Vaccine Study’s Continuing Impact on Public Health, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2015).
214. See id (reporting on parents who do not vaccinate their children due to the discredited link
between vaccines and autism).
215. Sam Frizell, Nearly One In Ten Americans Think Vaccines Are Unsafe, TIME (Feb. 9, 2015).
216. Peter Moore, Young Americans Most Worried About Vaccines, YOUGOV: LIFESTYLE (Jan. 30
2015, 12:01 p.m.), https://today.yougov.com/topics/lifestyle/articles-reports/2015/01/30/youngamericans-worried-vaccines.
217. E.g., Emily Willingham, Why Autism Speaks Doesn’t Speak For Me, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2013,
9:24 p.m.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilywillingham/2013/11/13/why-autism-speaks-doesntspeak-for-me/#3868a32a3152.
218. See e.g., 2014 Joint Letter To The Sponsors Of Autism Speaks, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY
NETWORK (Jan. 6, 2014), http://autisticadvocacy.org/2014/01/2013-joint-letter-to-the-sponsors-ofautism-speaks/ (criticizing the group Autism Speaks for, inter alia, failing to include autistic people on its
board or in leadership positions).
219. See Gabriella Vukelic, Pediatricians and the Pushback Against Vaccinations, ARIZ. NEWS SERV.
(Sept. 19, 2016) (noting that refusal of vaccines increased from 2006 to 2013 but refusal due to fear of
autism declined over the same time period).
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right to make that choice. States generally require that children be vaccinated to
attend public school, but offer exceptions for medical, religious or philosophical
reasons, as well as the possibility of private or home schooling.220 If parents make
this choice due to concerns about Autism, their rhetoric about avoiding Autism
can be damaging.
How this rhetoric has impacted people living with Autism (or autistic
people, as that term is preferred by many221), and how the rhetoric affects the
choices that parents make as somehow “owners” of the children’s lives, is of
concern to people with disabilities. Some Autistics argue that talk about finding
a ‘cure’ for Autism is misguided – the focus should be on conceptualizing autism
as part of “normal human diversity.”222
This represents the significant advocacy around ‘neurodiversity’ – a
movement to promote acceptance of the “range of thought patterns and behaviors
that characterize autism.”223 One study found that there are significant benefits
for some Autistics in certain preferred interests224, while some see autism as an
“opportunity” not a “weakness.”225
A second example of autonomous actors making decisions on behalf of
their children comes from an advancement that many see as a positive
development: cochlear implants. A cochlear implant is a “small, complex
electronic device that can help to provide a sense of sound to a person who is
profoundly deaf or severely hard-of-hearing.”226 Deaf and hard-of-hearing
children as young as 12 months old are approved to use cochlear implants.227
Parents of profoundly deaf or hard-of-hearing children are tasked with
making the decision for their children of whether to pursue a cochlear implant or
not. The implants are most effective for children when they are implanted at a

220. See States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from Immunization School
Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., (Jan. 30, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/schoolimmunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx. (outlining state immunization exemptions to highlight legal
rights for parents to withhold vaccinations from their children in religious or philosophical contexts).
221. For example, in an article for the New York Times, Amy Harmon details the perspective of one
Ms. Dawson, who in her own words describes herself as an autistic person: “I would appreciate it, if I end
up in your article, if you describe me as ‘an autistic’ or ‘an autistic person,’ versus the ‘person with,” “Just
like you would feel odd if people said you were a ‘person with femaleness.” Harmon, supra note 12.
222. Elizabeth Picciuto, They Don’t Want An Autism Cure, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 25, 2015).
223. Id.; see also Harmon, supra note 12 (discussing Autistic identity).
224. Shaun Heasley, Study: For Those with Autism, Fixations can be Beneficial, DISABILITY SCOOP
(Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2017/02/03/study-autism-fixations/23270/.
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young age, so early decisions can be critical.228 This means that the choice of
whether or not to accept the implant is often made before the child has an
opportunity to choose – the decision is made by the parent, who essentially
determines if the child will be Deaf or not.
This is a problem for many Deaf people, who argue that making this choice
on behalf of a child is inappropriate. Cochlear implants have been called an
“affront to [Deaf] culture.”229 The argument from the Deaf community is that
there is nothing about deaf individuals that needs to be “fixed.”230 Deaf protesters
at the “Listening and Spoken Language Symposium” in 2013, which featured
some affiliations with cochlear implant manufacturers, argued that the use of the
implants largely stems from “miseducating the parents of Deaf children.”231
This concept of miseducation – that parents (and potential parents) are
being influenced by stereotypes and outdated ideas about life with a disability, is
echoed below in the next section, which discusses parents who make choices
about whether to birth a child with a disability.
E. Prenatal Genetic Testing
During pregnancy, birth parents face a variety of choices. One of those
choices is whether to engage in prenatal testing for disabilities.232 Currently
available tests include “amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling, fetal nasal
bone measurements, nuchal translucency screening, blood tests (e.g. triple/quad
screens, maternal serum screening, alpha-fetoprotein tests), ultrasounds, urine
tests, and others.”233 If a potential issue is discovered, the parents face a second
choice: what to do with that information. Choices such as abortion on the basis
of the likelihood of the fetus developing a disability are, to say the least,
controversial.234 Prenatal testing is available that can identify a wide variety of
potential conditions.235 This section will discuss whether those choices might
harm people with disabilities from an anti-eliminationism perspective, and
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whether it is necessary to infringe on autonomy in order to account for that
perspective.236
One critique of prenatal testing states that it is “morally problematic, and
that it is driven by misinformation.”237 Another argues that “[t]he practices of
genetic and prenatal testing as well as physician-administered euthanasia then
become potentially eugenic practices within the context of a culture deeply
intolerant of disability.”238 These critiques are very similar to those of physicianassisted suicide, discussed infra in Section IV.C.. The key differences here are
the identities of the autonomous actor and the object of that action. A birth parent
making a decision regarding whether to terminate a pregnancy on the basis of
genetic testing is different from a person deciding whether to end their own life,
but such decision-makers might be subject to similar influences.239 For example,
genetic counselors may “have a tendency (subtly or not) to urge pregnant women
to subject their fetuses to prenatal testing and abort fetuses with disabilities.”240
From an anti-eliminationist perspective, terminating a pregnancy for these
reasons may signal that people with disabilities are less valued, or resources for
people with disabilities may be reduced if fewer people have a particular
disability. Consider the argument referenced in the discussion of subordination,
infra, that “a policy that encourages prebirth genetic deselection of persons with
disabilities is a public statement that the lives of the disabled are worth less than
those of the able-bodied. In addition, such a policy reduces the number of persons
with those disabilities, thus reducing their political effectiveness. . . . In short, it
engenders or reinforces public perceptions that the disabled should not exist,
making intolerance and discrimination toward them more likely.”241
236. There has been a great deal of ink spilled on the subject of genetic prenatal testing and selective
abortion; this Article only touches on the issues to illuminate the tensions. For more, see generally Michael
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The numbers bear this out. For example, in the United States, “an estimated
67 percent of fetuses with prenatally diagnosed Down syndrome are aborted.”242
Parents facing the choice may “feel a sense of loss because they no longer dream
that their child will get married, go to college or start a family of their own one
day — in other words, that they will not meet the conventional expectations for
the perfect middle-class life.”243 This is despite evidence that many people with
Down syndrome do go on to accomplish just those things.244
On the other hand, perhaps inquiry into the reasons behind any termination
of pregnancy is disruptive to the right of privacy held by pregnant people.245 The
threat of anti-choice legislation is a real threat related to subordination on the
basis of gender, and an anti-eliminationism perspective in one category should
not be used to support subordination.
Nevertheless, the anti-eliminationist concern seems to be different here than
in the assisted-suicide case. For example, it is possible that any forces of coercion
and misinformation could be more readily corrected here. In the case of suicide,
as discussed infra, it is one’s own lived experience of, for example,
discrimination and stigma or loss of autonomy, that may effectively coerce
someone into taking their own life.246 Here, that is not necessarily the case.
Although the parent decision-maker in question may or may not have disabilities
themselves, it may be that more accurate information about the quality of life for
a child with a particular disability is what is needed. If the critique of prenatal
testing and selective abortion is based on legacy problems of stigma and
misinformation, then a re-focusing on, for example, the ways in which children
with disabilities “can participate in the life of family, school, and community”
could potentially remedy those concerns.247
A proposal for more accurate information about the lives of children with
disabilities would not be out of line with current abortion jurisprudence. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, for example, recognized that states may take steps “to
ensure that choice is thoughtful and informed” and may “enact laws to provide a
reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision that has such a profound
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and lasting meaning.”248 However, if this argument sounds similar to the
proposals for giving ‘more information’ to women seeking abortions, which may
in reality be attempts to limit abortion rights, that is of concern to anyone who
does not seek to eliminate or restrict abortion rights.249 Furthermore, while
abortions on the basis of potential disability might impact the lives of poor people
with disabilities more,250 restrictions on abortion access impact poor women
more frequently.251 While an anti-eliminationism perspective need not
necessarily be in conflict with abortion rights, Samuel Bagenstos identifies that
the disability rights critique could “serve as a model for those who wish to defend
ever more stringent abortion regulations.”252 This Article has identified these
tensions, but a resolution that is satisfactory to both abortion rights and disability
rights may be more elusive.
The proposal for more information is also consistent with the guidelines of
the National Society of Genetic Counselors.253 The Society has specifically
issued guidelines for “communicating a prenatal or postnatal diagnosis of Down
syndrome,” recommending practices such as delivering a diagnosis in person;
allowing enough time for questions and planning a follow-up conversation;
provision of accurate and up-to-date information in a “balanced perspective,
including both positive aspects and challenges related to Down syndrome”;
providing the information in a sensitive and caring manner; avoiding value
judgements such that the information is “bad news”; avoiding outdated or
offensive terminology, including using person-centric language; and provision
of outside resources.254
Despite these guidelines, some parents of children with Down syndrome
report a much different experience with their doctors.255 A study of parents
reporting their experiences in learning such diagnoses found that the parents had
“negative experiences with medical professionals during the diagnosis
process.”256 The study identified the “importance of these early experiences for
parents of children with Down syndrome and emphasize[d] providing effective
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education, resources, and practical information from reliable sources.”257 At least
some of the concerns of disability rights activists in this area could be
ameliorated by more education, training, and information on all sides.258
CONCLUSION
Because anti-subordination perspectives are typically advanced in order to
help solve problems related to race, and to an extent gender, they are not
sufficiently developed for use in the disability context. While disability shares
many features with other marginalized groups, there are also different
complexities that are unique. This paper has identified one such complexity,
namely that autonomy comes into conflict with other values for people with
disabilities in ways that it does not for other groups. Here is where a central
problem for people with disabilities is left out of disability law theory.
Autonomy, in the self-ownership sense, is not necessarily in conflict with antisubordination for most groups, but it is in such conflict with disability. And, antieliminationism has now been identified as a uniquely disability-related concern.
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